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abstract: Lysias argues in XII 36 that if the Athenians condemned the Arginousai 
generals it would be right to condemn the Thirty. This argument implies that the 
generals were guilty and asserts that there was a strong conviction on the part of the 
Athenians that they should punish the generals. This is a clever rhetorical argument, 
which conformed to the Athenian ideology according to which the demos was blame-
less. However, Lysias avoids mentioning that the Athenians violated their law and tried 
the generals without a proper trial. This happens because the orator comments on the 
trial retrospectively. If he had to admit that the procedure was illegal, this would clearly 
have weakened his case; so he does not make this mistake.
keywords: Arginousai trial; generals; Lysias; Plato; Xenophon – Lisia; Platone; pro-
cesso delle Arginuse; Senofonte; strateghi.
One of the goals of Xenophon in his Hellenica was to promote his history 
in such a way as to criticize the excesses and deficiencies of Athenian 
democracy, creating an alternative version of the past, in opposition par-
ticularly to the version of events treated by the orators  1. He does not 
seem to have been particularly energetic or intelligent in searching for the 
truth when the truth was hard to discover, but we have no reason to think 
that he did not care about the truth, or that he wrote things which he 
knew were false  2. On the other hand, the orators referred to past events 
in order to serve their own rhetorical ends, i.e. to win a case  3. This means 
that although pieces of historical information could be accurate, these 
 * I am grateful to Professor P.J. Rhodes for his continuous assistance in order to 
see the present paper accepted for publication. The least I can do is to dedicate this 
work to him. Moreover, I heartily thank Professor F. Pownall, Professor C. Bearzot, Dr. 
P.A. Tuci and the two anonymous readers for their comments. Finally, I thank Profes-
sor A. Wolpert for correspondence and discussion on the subject. For possible omis-
sions or mistakes the responsibility is mine.
 1 See Pownall 2004, 3-4.
 2 Rhodes 1994, 167.
 3 See the detailed study of Nouhaud 1982.
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speeches were tendentious and did not aim at recording the historical 
reality of the past  4. Therefore, historians and orators had different aims, 
limits and audiences  5. 
Such an interesting example of a common reference to a historical 
event is the trial after Arginousai and its common mention by Xeno-
phon in his Hellenica (I 6, 29 - 7, 35) and the orator Lysias in his speech 
Against Eratosthenes (XII 36). It is the purpose of this paper to argue that 
Lysias refers to the naval battle at Arginousai and the trial after it in such 
a way as to achieve the conviction of Eratosthenes and does not really 
reflect what happened in the trial of the generals. This episode offers a 
very good case study on the use of the past by the oratorical versus the 
historiographical tradition and shows that the orators do not provide the 
whole truth.
Some words must be said about Eratosthenes’ trial first. The trial 
took place in 403/2 B.C.  6, i.e. only a few years after the trial of the Argi-
nousai generals. Lysias prosecuted Eratosthenes at the euthynai offered 
to former members of the Thirty by the amnesty of 403 B.C., bringing as 
the nominal charge the killing of Polemarchus and demanding the death 
penalty  7. However, Lysias lacked direct evidence against Eratosthenes. 
For this reason, Lysias paid more attention to the crimes committed by 
the Thirty in general than to those committed by Eratosthenes, as the 
structure and the content of the speech reveals  8, and treated them as a 
homogenous group  9. On the basis of this tactic, Lysias makes a com-
parison between the punishment of the generals who led the Athenian 
fleet at Arginousai and the Thirty. The relevant passage for the present 
investigation runs as follows: 
οὐκ οὖν δεινὸν εἰ τοὺς μὲν στρατηγούς, οἳ ἐνίκων ναυμαχοῦντες, ὅτε διὰ 
χειμῶνα οὐχ οἷοί τ’ ἔφασαν εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἀνελέσθαι, θανάτῳ 
ἐζημιώσατε, ἡγούμενοι χρῆναι τῇ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῇ παρ’ ἐκείνων δίκην 
 4 Cf. Worthington 1991, 55: «The orators do not record information in the same 
way and for the same ends as historical authors. Yet often the information supplied 
by oratory is still used to substantiate an argument without really assessing its validity: 
whether a certain narrative suits a particular context of a speech, whether there are serious 
clashes with our historical authors, whether a particular accusation occurs only in ora-
tory and in no other source. It is indeed likely that most of the historical information 
given in oratory is embellishment, even invention» (my emphasis).
 5 Cf. Todd 1990, 159-178, who points out the danger of accepting every piece of 
information in the orators at face value.
 6 For the date of the speech see Bearzot 1997, 42-44, 47-50, 227.
 7 See Phillips 2008, 154-156. 
 8 See Krentz 1984, 24; Lamers - Rademaker 2007, 466; Phillips 2008, 155.
 9 See Chiron 2002, 46-49.
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λαβεῖν, τούτους δέ, οἳ ἰδιῶται μὲν ὄντες καθ’ ὅσον ἐδύναντο ἐποίησαν ἡτ­
τη θῆναι ναυμαχοῦντας, ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέστησαν, ὁμολογοῦσιν 
ἑκόντες πολλοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ἀκρίτους ἀποκτιννύναι, οὐκ ἄρα χρὴ αὐτοὺς καὶ 
τοὺς παῖδας ὑφ’ ὑμῶν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ζημίαις κολάζεσθαι; 
Wouldn’t it be outrageous that you sentenced to death those generals who 
won the naval battle, although they said that a storm prevented them from 
rescuing sailors from the sea, since you deemed that you ought to exact 
justice from them for the bravery of the dead? These men (i.e. the Thirty) 
by contrast did whatever they could as private citizens to make us lose the 
naval battle, and when they came to power, as they admit, they intention-
ally executed many citizens without a trial. And yet should neither they 
nor their children receive from you the most severe punishment? 
Lysias’ point is: if generals who had won a great victory were executed 
for failing to recover shipwrecked sailors, how could an Athenian court 
acquit Eratosthenes when he worked with the enemy to defeat Athens? 
The content of the argument is striking and unusual. We know that 
an Athenian verdict was determined by a tally of individual judges’ votes 
and never included a statement of their reasoning. Lanni has remarked 
that in more than half of the speeches which include references to previ-
ous decisions, Athenian litigants make no attempt to use the ratio dicendi 
of a past verdict as a guide for the proper interpretation and application 
of the laws in the current case. Eight passages record the penalties given 
in previous cases and urge the jury to treat the current defendant in the 
same spirit of severity. These passages do not shed light on how the jury 
should interpret the facts or laws involved in the current case, and often 
involve examples of punishment for crimes completely unrelated to the 
case at hand. One of the most puzzling exceptions to this rule is Lysias’ 
discussion of the punishment of the Arginousai generals-hardly a sterling 
exemplum of Athenian justice-used by Lysias to incite the current jury 
to deliver a guilty verdict. In this passage the speaker is simply provid-
ing past examples of severe punishments and encouraging the current 
jury not to be lenient in the current case. His inflammatory references to 
previous cases in no way assist the jury in reaching an appropriate verdict 
in the matter before them  10. 
However, Gish, unlike Lanni, does not see anything illegal in the 
Arginousai trial. Instead, he claims that Lysias seems to assimilate the 
treason of the generals of Arginousai to that of the Thirty and that from 
 10 The eight passages are: Lys. XII 36; XXII 16; Dem. XXIV 138; XXXIV 50; 
Din. I 23; Hyp. 5, col. 27; Aeschin. I 173; III 252. The other exception is Aeschin. I 173, 
who refers to Socrates’ execution on the grounds of his having taught Critias. Lanni 
2006b, 121-122.
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this statement we gather that there is «no indelible mark of error or injus-
tice on the hands of the demos», «no taint of illegality with respect to 
the trial and execution and no sense of regret». For him Lysias makes 
a direct and approving reference to the precedent set in the case of the 
Arginousai generals  11.
It is the opinion of the present author that Lysias does not endorse 
the judgment of the demos in putting to death the generals of Arginusai. 
We can assess Lysias’ passage by examining its rhetorical treatment of 
this recent historical event, its ideological dimension and finally its his-
torical reliability.
Let us focus first on Lysias’ rhetorical treatment of the case, analyz-
ing what he says word by word. First of all, I may remark that litigants 
always named a man and then defined him as στρατηγός, obviously 
because it was not easy for the audience to understand to whom a 
speaker referred  12. Nonetheless, here it is noteworthy that Lysias takes 
it for granted that the jurors knew that he was referring to the generals 
of Arginousai. Then, he calls them the commanders who were victorious 
in a sea battle. The only victorious Athenian naval battle at the end of 
the Peloponnesian War, accomplished by a group of generals, was that 
at Arginousai  13. Thus, everyone could identify these commanders with 
the commanders of Arginousai. This can only mean that their memory 
was still alive. On the basis of this social knowledge about the Arginousai 
generals, Lysias emphasizes that the Athenians imposed the death pen-
alty on them (θανάτῳ ἐζημιώσατε) and claims that the Athenians deemed 
it necessary (ἡγούμενοι χρῆναι)  14 to take such a decision. It is noteworthy 
 11 Gish 2012, 171. 
 12 Thus, Andoc. I 11 says: ῏Ην μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, 
Νικίᾳ καὶ Λαμάχῳ καὶ Α᾿λκιβιάδῃ. Isocrates first mentions the names of Agamemnon 
and Timotheus and then calls them generals (see XII 74, 76 and XV 106 respectively). 
Aeschin. II 92 does the same with the general Chares. Lys. XIII 78 defines Anytus as 
general, a fact which allows him to refer to his office later on without naming him again: 
στρατηγοῦ ἀνδρὸς. In the same text the speaker claims that Agoratus is responsible for 
the death of those generals and officers who resisted to the subversion of democracy. 
The speaker does not mention the name of these generals during his speech, but they 
are read to the jurors by the secretary (XIII 38-39). The reason why this happens is that 
they were too many (XIII 62). Note that Aeschin. III 186 transports the jurors to the 
Stoa Poikile, where the battle of Marathon is depicted, and says: Τίς οὖν ἦν ὁ στρατηγός; 
οὑτωσὶ μὲν ἐρωτηθέντες ἅπαντες ἀποκρίναισθε ἂν ὅτι Μιλτιάδης, ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιγέγραπται. 
This means that it was the monument that helped the Athenians to identify the general. 
 13 Alcibiades was credited with the victories at Abydus (Xen. I 1, 5-7) and Cyzicus 
(I 1, 16-18) as well as the defeat at Notium (Xen. I 5, 11-14) as his.
 14 For this translation of the verb see LSJ s.v. ἡγοῦμαι III 4.
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that the verb ἡγοῦμαι expresses strong conviction in Greek  15, while its 
use with the infinitive χρῆναι is rare in the orators  16. Moreover, we must 
take into consideration that the verb ἡγοῦμαι was connected with mat-
ters of justice and the laws  17 and the verdict of the jurors  18 and implied 
their moral obligation to convict someone in order to avoid incurring the 
social reproach of their fellow citizens  19. Lysias asserts that there was a 
strong conviction on the part of the Athenians that they should punish 
the generals. Then, the orator gives the reason for the punishment of the 
generals, which was the virtue (ἀρετή) of the dead men. This claim is in 
accordance with the belief of the Athenians that they should give priority 
to their oarsmen instead of their generals  20. Finally, he concludes with 
the phrase λαμβάνω δίκην in order to intimate that only the death penalty 
against the Arginousai generals could appease the living for the loss of 
the dead  21. Consequently, Lysias gives a legal and moral reasoning to the 
decision of the Athenians to execute the generals.
It is time to proceed to the ideological side of the orator’s argument. 
In my opinion, Lysias’ interpretation of the decision of the Athenians to 
punish the generals is successful. This happens because it recalls what 
Ober has called ‘the Athenians’ democratic knowledge’, i.e. the belief in 
the superior wisdom of decisions made collectively by the citizens and 
 15 See [Lys.] XX 5 with Αποστολάκης 2003, 139.
 16 See Antiph. V 12, where the speaker says to his accuser «you deem it necessary 
(ἡγῇ χρῆναι) that your illegal conduct should take precedence over the laws themselves» 
(my emphasis). Moreover, see Isaeus I 51, where the speaker says to the jurors «It would 
be really extraordinary if you vote that our opponents should have the whole estate 
when they recognize our right to receive a part of it, and deem necessary (ἡγήσεσθε 
χρῆναι) they should receive more than they considered themselves entitled to, but don’t 
think that we deserve even what our opponents concede to us» (translations by Gagarin 
1998 and Edwards 2007 respectively).
 17 See Pl. Cri. 51a4, where the Laws supposedly say to Socrates that they decided 
to execute him, because they believed (ἡγούμενοι) that this was just and 53b7 that the 
citizens of other cities will have the conviction (ἡγούμενοι) that Socrates is a corrupter 
of the laws if he escapes from prison. For a close connection of the verb with justice see 
also Dem. VII 31; [Dem.] LVI 14; Aeschin. III 85.
 18 See Lys. XXII 19; Din. I 41; Dem. Exord. 6, 1.
 19 See Din. I 41, who claims that the jurors should feel shame that they must 
inflict a punishment on Demosthenes only because they make such a strong conviction 
(ἡγούμενοι) on the basis of the speeches of the plaintiffs. 
 20 Andoc. I 142 claims that the Spartans did not want to destroy Athens after the 
defeat at Aegospotami because of the virtues of those men (τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετάς) who laid 
the foundations of freedom for the whole of Greece. For further evidence see Kapellos 
2018, 404.
 21 Cf. Allen 2000, 69 that the phrase λαμβάνω δίκην highlighted the exchange of 
justice between the punisher and the punished.
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the belief in their innate intellectual superiority  22. Hansen comments on 
the power of persuasion in Athenian democracy, saying that the funda-
mental article of faith was «the demos is always right» and, accordingly, 
ideally, «the orator should be simply the mouthpiece of unspoken mass 
will»  23. Regarding the relationship between the demos and its officials 
in times of crisis, Elster points out that Athenian politics was result-ori-
ented, that is its people were held accountable for the outcome of their 
actions regardless of extenuating circumstances  24. Todd points out that 
the punishment of the Athenian leaders can be explained by the fact that 
in Greek political life results mattered more than good intentions. Deci-
sions for punishment should be explained because of the concept of the 
sovereignty of the demos according to which there was no way for its 
decisions to be wrong  25. We must also note that the orator identifies 
the jurors with the demos, i.e. he follows a strategy common to other 
orators when it fits their case  26. Although it was not possible for all the 
men on this jury to have participated in the Arginousai trial, this rhe-
torical fiction allowed the Athenians to imagine the rule of the people 
as transcending time and place, as well as individuals and institutions, 
and to represent the demos as eternal and unchanging  27. On the basis 
of this analysis, we can be quite certain that Lysias tries to strengthen 
his jury’s authority by justifying the punishment of the Arginousai com-
manders. 
Moreover, it is apparent that Lysias’ call to the jurors to reproduce 
the severe punishment of the generals voted in the trial presupposes their 
guilt and that by the construction of an argument on the basis of anal-
ogy he is inciting the current court to find Eratosthenes guilty and to 
impose a severe penalty  28. Lysias’ speech belongs to those cases where 
an orator refers to a previous trial where the court had imposed death, 
and although the claim had nothing to do with the legal issue under dis-
cussion, his aim was to overcome the court’s natural reluctance to put 
someone to death  29. Therefore, Lysias’ seemingly direct and approving 
 22 See Ober 1989, 33-38.
 23 Hansen 1990, 350. 
 24 See Elster 1999, 264-265.
 25 Todd 1993, 306. For the concept «sovereignty of the demos» which meant all 
the political decisions of the demos see Ostwald 1987, XIX, 40-42, 47-66, 77-83.
 26 For another case see Blanshard 2004, 37-39.
 27 For this rhetorical device see Wolpert 2003, 537-555.
 28 These remarks belong to Lanni 2006a, 161-162.
 29 See Harris 2007, 368. 
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reference to the precedent set in the case of the Arginousai generals and 
his assimilation with the crimes of the Thirty  30 seems justified. 
However, Lysias’ historical accuracy with regard to the legality of 
the trial is another issue and the best way to test it is to compare it with 
Xenophon’s Hellenica, which offers a detailed account of the events at 
Arginousai and the different phases of the trial that ensued in Athens  31. 
Someone might think that we should not assume too straightforwardly 
that Xenophon’s account is uncontroversially true because he was not a 
lover of democracy  32. In addition, Xenophon’s determination to present 
the generals as innocent stands out clearly  33. Thus, it would suit him to 
suggest that the democracy not only made the wrong decision but arrived 
at that decision improperly. On the other hand, we must not forget that 
Xenophon was a historian who wanted to tell the truth, as I pointed out 
in the beginning of this paper and as I will argue a little later. Moreover, 
we must bear in mind that his Hellenica does not have a consistently anti-
democratic bent and his narrative of the Arginousai trial seems to contain 
elements of both blame and exoneration of the Athenian democracy  34. 
In fact, Xenophon had a fundamental interest in the operation and 
improvement of Athens, rather than a wholesale rejection of its systems 
and values. For him the problem was not necessarily democracy, but 
rather the ability of to plethos to govern without the interdependent guid-
ance of truly capable leadership  35. Thus, although Xenophon’s account 
may be distorted to some extent because of his political views, there is 
no reason to think that what he says is fundamentally untrue. Therefore, 
Xenophon’s description of the trial can shed light on Lysias’ difficulties 
in describing the trial in a clear way.
There is one more problem to solve in this investigation. Our 
understanding of the Arginousai trial is hampered because Xenophon’s 
account is in contrast with Diodorus’ account, especially in its estimate of 
Theramenes’ role and the behaviour of the demos. However, we should 
not discard the historicity of Xenophon’s account, which is a contempo-
rary source, and we should consider that the image of the «democrat» 
Theramenes in Diodorus most probably comes from the Ephorian tradi-
 30 For the brutal violence of the Thirty see Wolpert 2006, 213-223.
 31 For the phases of the trial and a thorough attempt to investigate the illegalities 
of the trial see Tuci 2002, 51-85.
 32 See more recently Tamiolaki 2013, 31-50 about Xenophon’s oligarchic percep-
tions in Athenian democracy.
 33 Andrewes 1974, 122.
 34 See Kroeker 2011, 220-221.
 35 See Brown Ferrario 2017, 57-83, especially 69-71 for the Arginousai episode.
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tion which is not credible  36. Nevertheless, I will also point out the simi-
larities of the accounts of the two historians  37. The usefulness of doing 
that comes from the fact that it is not certain whether Diodorus draws 
his information from Xenophon or not in those points where they agree. 
So if Diodorus draws from Ephorus, then Xenophon’s account becomes 
more reliable and thus we can shed more light on the events of the trial  38. 
Then I shall demonstrate that Lysias did not accurately remind the jurors 
of what had really happened in the trial of the generals.
It is time to read Xenophon’s account of the battle of Arginousai 
and the trial after it  39. The historian reports that the Athenians fought a 
sea battle and defeated the Lacedaimonians (ἐναυμάχησαν […] ἐνίκησαν: 
Hell. I 6, 33)  40. The generals, Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, 
Thrasyllus, Erasinides, Protomachus and Aristogeiton (τοῖς στρατηγοῖς), 
decided to send forty-seven vessels to the sinking ships under the orders 
of the trierarchs Thrasybulus and Theramenes in order to collect them 
but they were prevented by a great storm (χειμών: I 6, 35). The com-
manders informed their fellow citizens, sending a letter to Athens and 
explaining the facts to them (I 7, 4) without accusing Theramenes and 
Thrasybulus  41. When the Athenians learned the news, they deposed the 
generals in a meeting of the Assembly  42, most probably because they did 
not believe that the generals could not save their crews. Six of the generals 
who fought in the naval battle (τῶν ναυμαχησάντων στρατηγῶν) returned 
to the city. Two of them, Protomachus and Aristogenes, decided not to 
follow their colleagues (I 7, 2). 
 36 For previous assessments of the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus see 
Andrewes 1974, 112-122; Kagan 1987, 362-375; Krentz 1989, 58-61. For an overall 
attempt to defend Theramenes and his involvement in the Arginousai trial see Hurni 
2010 but see the review of Bearzot 2013a, 137-143, especially 140. For arguments 
against Diodorus’ account see Bearzot 2013b, 95-97. See Bearzot 2012, 293-294, 297-
300 for the influence of Ephorian tradition on Diodorus and especially Bearzot 2015 for 
a detailed assessment of Xenophon’s account (see further below).
 37 See Bearzot 2015, 178-179 who has already made such a comparison; but the 
subject allows further research.
 38 See Bearzot 2011, 17-18.
 39 Bearzot 2013b, 89-91 has offered an important summary of Xenophon’s 
account. My own reading of Xenophon aims at shedding light on some other aspects of 
his text but I also write having in mind Lysias’ speech.
 40 Diod. XIII 102, 4 says that the naval battle at Arginousai was the greatest battle 
between Greeks.
 41 Diodorus’ report that the generals accused Theramenes and that he defended 
himself does not seem credible, while Lys. XXX 14 indicates, if it does not prove, that 
Theramenes and his associates attacked the generals. See in detail Bearzot 2015, 179-182.
 42 See Gish 2012, 174, 177.
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When the six generals returned home, Archedemus, the current cham-
pion of the demos, who was in charge of the two-obol allowance, imposed 
a fine on Erasinides and accused him in court, claiming that he held money 
from the Hellespont, which belonged to the demos  43. Archedemus also 
accused Erasinides in connection with his generalship. Archedemus was 
convincing, so the jury decided to imprison Erasinides (I 7, 1-2).
When the commanders returned to Athens, they reported in the 
Council about the sea battle and the seriousness of the storm (οἱ στρα­
τη γοὶ περί τε τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ χειμῶνος). Nevertheless, 
they were not convincing. Timocrates proposed the imprisonment of 
the generals and the Councillors accepted it. The Council voted that the 
Assembly should decide whether the generals had committed an offence 
actionable by eisangelia (I 7, 3)  44. 
The second Assembly meeting related to the trial  45 was called to 
hear denunciations against the generals  46. Theramenes accused the 
generals that they did not collect (οὐκ ἀνείλοντο) the shipwrecked men 
and demanded that they should be subjected to an audit  47. Theramenes 
showed the letter which the generals (οἱ στρατηγοί) had sent to the Coun-
cil and the Assembly, accusing nobody else but the storm (τὸν χειμῶνα: 
I  7, 4). The generals defended their actions briefly but they were not 
given the time to speak allotted by law  48. For Xenophon this was illegal  49 
and probably he means that the generals were not allowed to speak for 
the length of time normally allotted to defendants in a public trial, which 
may have been up to three hours each  50.
Then, the generals said that they had ordered Theramenes and Thras-
ybulus to accomplish the task of collection (τὴν δὲ ἀναίρεσιν: I 7, 5). They 
argued that if the Athenians were to blame someone regarding the col-
lection of the crews (περὶ τῆς ἀναιρέσεως), they should accuse those who 
 43 For the diobelia see the concise comment of Krentz 1989, 160. For Archedemus 
and the diobelia see Blok 2015, 87-102.
 44 See Ostwald 1986, 436-437. Xenophon does not use the word eisangelia but 
trial by the Assembly does suggest this procedure. 
 45 See Gish 2012, 178. 
 46 For arguments that this meeting was not a trial see Ostwald 1986, 437.
 47 See Ostwald 1986, 438.
 48 Diod. XIII 101, 6 confirms that the Assemblymen did not let the generals 
speak.
 49 Ostwald 1986, 438 argues that the law stipulated that the generals should not 
be given the time to defend themselves. However, Harris 2013, 342, n. 120 rightly 
points out that Ostwald’s interpretation of the passage is inconsistent with the tenor of 
Xenophon’s account. 
 50 Harris 2013, 242.
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received the order. Nevertheless, they pointed out that nobody should 
take the blame for the loss of men except for the weather which prevented 
the collection of the crews (τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος […] τὴν ἀναίρεσιν: I 7, 
6). Many captains and men who served with the commanders at Arginou-
sai confirmed what their superiors said; the Athenians were almost con-
vinced that the generals had been telling the truth. Nevertheless, it was 
already dark; so the Assemblymen decided that they should adjourn the 
session for another meeting and resolved that the Council should propose 
the way in which the commanders were to be judged (I 7, 7). This was a 
request for guidance concerning the procedure to be used in the generals’ 
case, to which the Council was free to respond by ordering a trial but 
might equally well order that the euthyna take its normal course and that 
its outcome determine whether judicial action was necessary  51.
Shortly after the first meeting of the Assembly the Athenians cel-
ebrated the festival of Apatouria, where the fathers and the relatives meet 
together (I 7, 8)  52. For the generals the timing could not have been worse. 
The bereaved would gather and family losses in the recent battle would 
be all too clear  53. If some of the relatives of the dead participated in the 
next Assembly meeting, they would be rather hostile to the Arginousai 
commanders.
Theramenes grasped the opportunity to conspire against the gener-
als. He made a two-fold scheme. First, his men  54 prepared many false 
mourners to mingle in the Assembly with the real ones. Athens was not 
a face-to-face society  55; so it would not be easy for the participants to 
recognize the real from the fake mourners  56. This would lead the rest of 
the Assemblymen to be pressed psychologically by the mourners that the 
generals should not have left their men to die despite their allegation that 
the weather was very bad. 
Second, Theramenes’ men persuaded Callixenus to accuse the generals 
(Xen. Hell. I 7, 8). We must explain why Theramenes needed Callixenus. 
We have seen that the Council was already hostile to the generals. Nev-
 51 Ostwald 1986, 439.
 52 For this festival see Krentz 1989, 161. 
 53 Tritle 2010, 211.
 54 Note that Diod. XIII 101, 7 also mentions that Theramenes had followers whom 
he turned against the generals.
 55 For the argument that Athens was not a face-to-face society see Ober 1989, 
31-33; Hunter 1994, 97-98.
 56 Therefore, I disagree with Kagan 1987, 369 and Krentz 1989, 162 who believe 
that the historicity of Theramenes’ ploy is wrong. For the historicity of this incident see 
also Sordi 1992, 12-13 and Bearzot 2015, 182-183.
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ertheless, it was not certain for Theramenes that the bouleutai would be 
willing to vote a decree which said that the generals had already defended 
themselves in the previous session of the Assembly. Obviously, Callixenus 
was a competent speaker who could convince his colleagues to accept 
his proposal that no more time should be given to the generals to defend 
themselves  57. Indeed, this man convinced the Council, as Euryptolemus 
explicitly says in his speech (I 7, 26), to vote his probouleuma  58 according 
to which the generals (τῶν στρατηγῶν) had already been given the time to 
defend themselves in the previous meeting of the Assembly. The Athe-
nians should simply decide about the wrongdoing of the commanders 
who did not collect those who had been victorious in the sea battle (οἱ 
στρατηγοί […] οὐκ ἀνελόμενοι τοὺς νικήσαντας ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ: Hell. I 7, 9). 
This sentence of the decree is noteworthy because it considered the lost 
crews the victors of the naval battle at Arginousai but not the generals. 
In the third meeting of the Assembly  59, which was a trial session  60, 
an anonymous man spoke first and claimed in an emotional way  61 that 
the drowning men told him to deliver the message that the generals had 
not picked up the most worthy men who died for their fatherland (οἱ 
στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους: I 7, 
11). This story was dishonest and aimed at arousing a hostile reaction to 
the Assemblymen  62.
Euryptolemus and some others tried to stop Callixenus’ decree with 
a graphe paranomon (I 7, 12), because it violated the law that no one 
should be put to death without a proper trial  63. Some Athenians praised 
Euryptolemus’ reaction but the majority of the Athenians thought that 
democracy was threatened  64. Thus, they turned into a mob  65 and said 
that they would do whatever they liked, proving in this way their deter-
 57 Thus, I disagree with Kagan 1987, 370, n. 37 who thinks that Callixenus’ pro-
posal is implausible and unnecessary. Note that Diod. XIII 103, 2 also says that Cal-
lixenus deceived the Councillors and made a proposal, apparently against the generals.
 58 See Bearzot 2014, 97.
 59 See Gish 2012, 181.
 60 See Bauman 1990, 73.
 61 See Gish 2012, 181.
 62 See Hamel 2015, 82.
 63 Mehl 1982, 32-80 has attempted to prove in detail that the Assembly was not 
guilty of any procedural flaw. However, Harris 2013, 342 provides evidence which 
proves the existence of this law. Hamel 2015, 83-84 claims that there was no violation 
of any law in the trial, but her analysis is weak, because she does not take into account 
Harris’ evidence. Cf. also the review of Foster 2016, 3 for a negative criticism of Hamel 
on this point.
 64 See Lévy 1990, 149.
 65 See Pownall 2000, 500.
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mination to violate the law (I 7, 13). One man called Lyciscus made a 
speech and said that Euryptolemus and the others should be judged by 
the same vote as the generals unless they withdrew their call for a trial 
against Callixenus. The mob shouted again in approval of his proposal. 
Euryptolemus and those who agreed with him were forced to abandon 
bringing their legal demands for a trial (I 7, 13). 
The prytaneis, the officials who presided over Assembly meetings, 
reacted when they saw that their fellow citizens wanted to violate the law 
and said that they would not approve the voting of Callixenus’ decree. 
However, all of them stepped back out of fear when they saw the Athe-
nians behaving as a dangerous rabble. Only Socrates was not scared and 
said that he would not violate the law (I 7, 14-15)  66. The people did not 
stop feeling that democracy was in danger. Socrates’ refusal was ignored 
and the process went forward  67. 
However, Socrates’ refusal gave Euryptolemus the opportunity 
to attempt to change the mind of his fellow citizens through a brave 
speech. This is not actually the speech that Euryptolemus delivered in 
the Assembly but a version of it that Xenophon created for his audience. 
On the other hand, the historian was still in Athens when the trial took 
place  68, so he could have talked with some of those who participated in 
the trial  69 if he was not present himself. Thus, it would be useful to take 
into account Euryptolemus’ speech for the assessment of the trial. 
Euryptolemus urged the Athenians not to be deceived by anyone 
but respect the law which gave an equal hearing to the defendants and 
proposed that they should judge the generals under the decree of Can-
nonus  70 or the law about traitors in order to act legally (I 7, 19-23)  71. 
He warned them that if they judged the generals without a proper trial 
(ἀκρίτους), this would be equal to fighting along with the Spartans 
against their own city, while their commanders had already defeated 
their enemies (νενικηκότας: I 7, 25). He urged them not to be afraid 
 66 Xenophon repeats Socrates’ different stance in the Assembly in Xen. Mem. 
I  1, 18; IV 4, 2. Plato confirms in his Apology (32a9-c3) that Socrates spoke against 
the violation of the law in the generals’ trial (see further below in this paper). See also 
[Pl.] Ax. 368d6-a2, who praises Socrates for his determination not to violate the law in 
the Arginousai trial. 
 67 Kagan 1987, 371.
 68 See Anderson 1974, 61 about Xenophon’s presence in Athens.
 69 Note that Xenophon was competent enough to find out and write down in 
his account that there were Athenians who wanted to speak against Alcibiades in the 
Assembly meeting in which he defended himself (I 4, 20).
 70 For the decree of Cannonus see in detail Lavelle 1988, 19-41.
 71 See Allen 2000, 324-325.
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but believe in the law (I 7, 26); otherwise they might regret it later (I 7, 
27). Euryptolemus claimed that it would be a terrible thing (δεινὰ δ’ ἂν 
ποιήσαιτε) if the Athenians had allowed Aristarchus, one of the Four 
Hundred, who betrayed Oenoe to the Thebans  72, to have a proper trial, 
but denied this right to the generals who defeated the Lacedaimonians 
(τοὺς […] στρατηγοὺς […] νικήσαντας: I 7, 28). Euryptolemus’ mention of 
Aristarchus is serious because it makes an implicit connection between 
the oligarchs who had subverted the democracy in 411 B.C. and the 
Arginousai commanders. Τhe oligarchic regime continued to haunt the 
Athenian democracy, so the Assemblymen must have thought that the 
generals had evil plans against their city  73. This explains why they pro-
tested earlier that the democracy was under threat.
For this reason Euryptolemus urged the Assemblymen to consider 
again the facts which supposedly showed the guilt of the generals (τοῖς 
στρατηγοῖς). He said that when the generals had won the sea battle (τῇ 
ναυμαχίᾳ), they landed on the shore and decided that one squadron 
should collect (ἀναιρεῖσθαι) the shipwrecked while the other would sail 
against Eteonicus (I 7, 29-30). He asserted that it would be just for the 
Athenians to ask Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were responsible for 
the collection of the crews (τοὺς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀναίρεσιν), to explain why 
they did not do so (οὐκ ἀνείλοντο: I 7, 31). Nevertheless, he pinpointed 
that the weather (ὁ χειμών) had prevented them from doing what the com-
manders (οἱ στρατηγοί) planned. He also reminded the Assemblymen that 
even one of the generals was picked up from a shipwreck (ἀναιρέσεως: 
I 7, 32)  74. Euryptolemus concluded his speech by saying that it would be 
more just if the Athenians crowned the victors with wreaths instead of 
punishing them with death (τοὺς νικῶντας ἢ θανάτῳ ζημιοῦν) as traitors, 
being convinced by evil men (I 7, 33)  75.
The verdict of the trial was a difficult matter. The Athenians accepted 
Euryptolemus’ proposal initially, but when one Menecles objected, 
asking for a repetition of the vote  76, they decided to condemn the gener-
als to death (I 7, 34)  77. Xenophon leaves no doubt that the demos proved 
 72 Cf. Thuc. VIII 98, 3, who narrates how immediately after the fall of the Four 
Hundred Aristarchus managed to occupy Oenoe with a company of Scythian bowmen.
 73 See Gish 2012, 163-167, 172.
 74 Diod. XIII 99, 3 names this general, it was Lysias. 
 75 Diod. XIII 102, 5 says that the generals were worthy of wreaths.
 76 See Carawan 2007, 20, n. 4; Sommerstein 2013, 50-52.
 77 Diod. XIII 101, 7 confirms Xenophon that the generals were condemned to 
death. Plut. Per. 37, 6 says that Pericles, one of the Arginousai generals, was condemned 
to death in the Arginousai trial along with his colleagues.
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itself fickle  78 because it was still acting in passion and haste. This is also 
the reason why the death sentence was carried out immediately on the 
generals. 
Nonetheless, Xenophon allows us to realize that one year after the 
trial the Athenians regretted their decision  79, evidently because they 
understood what Xenophon has shown, namely that the generals had 
not done any injustice to the city  80. The citizens of Athens were blame-
less  81, so they took legal action again and issued a probole  82 against 
Callixenus and four other men who had deceived them regarding the 
innocence of the generals  83. These men must have been Archedemus, 
Timocrates, Lyciscus, and Menecles, namely the men who had attacked 
the generals  84. The Athenians did not issue any legal procedure against 
Theramenes, but this is not surprising. Theramenes had stopped accus-
ing the Arginousai commanders after his presence in the second meeting 
of the Assembly, so the Athenians could not hold him responsible for the 
generals’ execution  85. Later, during a civil strife in which Cleophon was 
executed in a sham trial  86, Callixenus and the other four escaped before 
being brought to court  87. Had Callixenus faced a trial, he would have 
been accused of lying about the supposed treason of the generals. Since 
he escaped no trial was possible. 
In the meantime, the Athenians contemplated the Arginousai trial 
again, since in 405/4 B.C. Aristophanes mentioned in his Frogs that the 
Athenians had second thoughts about the trial and its verdict  88. A little 
later the Athenians decided that their previous decision about the Argin-
ousai generals was illegal. Plato testifies to this in his Apology of Socrates, 
saying explicitly that all the Athenians decided that their previous deci-
 78 See Pownall 2000, 500-501.
 79 See Rhodes 1972, 145. Diod. XIII 103, 1 also says that the Athenians regretted 
their decision.
 80 Diod. XIII 102, 4 explicitly says that the generals did not do any injustice to the 
city.
 81 See supra, pp. 23-25.
 82 For this procedure in the present occasion see Krentz 1989, 169.
 83 Diod. XIII 103, 1-2 does not say anything about the probole, but he says twice 
that the Athenians were deceived. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 34, 1 also says that the demos was 
deceived. For the meaning of deception see Bearzot 2017a, 271-272.
 84 See Lang 1992, 277.
 85 As Krentz 1995, 131 remarks.
 86 See Krentz 1989, 170.
 87 Diod. XIII 103, 2 focuses only on Callixenus and says that he escaped before 
facing a trial.
 88 See Allan 2012, 101-114.
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sion about the Arginousai generals was illegal (32b2-5)  89. It is a fact that 
Plato undertook a literary defence of Socrates in his Apology and that 
he largely took a ‘rejectionist’ stance to the Athenian democracy  90. So 
someone might think that we should not believe Plato but suspect that he 
and Xenophon exaggerated about the Arginousai trial in order to praise 
Socrates  91.
At this point we must assess the historical veracity of Plato’s testi-
mony. We cannot be absolutely certain what the historical Socrates said 
in his own defence, but Plato was present at Socrates’ trial (Apol. 34a, 
38b). This is not something we should dismiss, because Plato was among 
the bystanders  92 and could hear what Socrates had said. Plato undoubt-
edly commemorates and defends his master, so the Apology is his version 
of Socrates’ speech in self-defense  93. However, if Plato’s Apology did not 
present at least the general substance  94 or the gist  95 of Socrates’ speech, 
this would have provoked a reaction from the associates of Socrates  96. 
We must not doubt that the speech is intended to recapture something 
of the freshness of the trial  97. Moreover, we must not forget that it was 
in the year after Plato’s dokimasia that Socrates attempted to prevent the 
Assembly from trying and executing the generals of Arginousai  98. This 
means that Plato must have heard about the way the commanders had 
been tried and executed  99. Moreover, he must have seen the regret of his 
fellow citizens at the execution of the generals and their wish for probolai 
against Callixenus. Finally, he could have heard or read the decree of 
the Athenians according to which they decided that the execution of the 
 89 ῾Υμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβου­
λεύ σασθε ἁθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν. Plato 
mentions ten generals, while Xenophon in the Hellenica and Diodorus name eight, but 
this is not a problem for the legality of the trial (see Krentz 1989, 159-160). Moreover, it 
does not affect my analysis.
 90 See Kroeker 2009, 208-209.
 91 For instance, Mehl 1982, 38 has noted that Plato and Socrates belong to the 
Socratic circle.
 92 See Lanni 1997, 183-189.
 93 See Wallace 2013, 99-112.
 94 See Allen 1980, 34.
 95 See Waterfield 2013, 12.
 96 As Wilamowitz 1920, 50 has remarked.
 97 Cf. Munn 2000, 293: «to ignore the presence of the historical Socrates is to 
overlook a vital dimension of the meaning of Plato’s writings, however problematic its 
nature. Plato was the historian of Socrates».
 98 For this biographical information from Plato’s life in Athens see Nails 2006, 3.
 99 It is certain that Plato must have had some information about the Arginousai 
trial, since he left Athens three years after Socrates’ execution, as Nails 2006, 5 remarks.
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generals was illegal. Thus, when Plato witnessed Socrates talking about 
the Arginousai trial in court, he was not hearing this information for the 
first time. Therefore, Plato’s information about the trial of the generals 
and Socrates’ role in it cannot be doubted regarding its historicity. This is 
very important for our evaluation of the aftermath of the Arginousai trial 
because it means that it became a legally established fact after the official 
decision of the Athenians, as Plato says. The only reasonable explanation 
for this reaction of the Athenians must be that they felt remorse. 
Finally, one more incident happened that reminded the Athenians 
of the trial, namely Callixenus’ return to the city. The former Councillor 
who had convinced the boule to pass the illegal decree against the gener-
als and had led the Assemblymen to accept his proposal came back to 
the city after the restoration of democracy with the democrats. However, 
he was not prosecuted because of the amnesty  100. Perhaps this made 
the Athenians hate him and let him die out of starvation (Xen. Hell. I 7, 
35)  101. In my opinion, this was the final step of the people to forget that 
the Arginousai trial had not been legally handled. 
Now it is time to relate what we know about the trial with Lysias’ 
speech. Comparing Xenophon’s account of the trial with Lysias’ passage 
we can realize that its wording recalls that of the historian. Moreover, 
it is easy to define the common points about the Arginousai generals in 
the two authors and between Lysias and Euryptolemus. More specifi-
cally we realize that: (1) the commanders were victorious in the sea battle 
against the generals; (2) they were not able to collect the shipwrecked 
men because of the bad weather  102. Concerning Lysias’ first argument, 
i.e. his reference to the victory of the generals, we can explain it by saying 
this was an undisputed fact for everyone. The second argument seems to 
acknowledge the generals’ argument for not being able to save their men 
as true. Most probably Lysias justifies the commanders because he knew 
about the argument of extenuating circumstances, as he shows when he 
rejects Eratosthenes’ claims that he acted under duress  103.
 100 See Sinclair 1988, 172.
 101 The lexicon of Suda s.v. ἐναύειν says that «Callixenus the Athenian because 
of his sycophancy suffered the rewards of his shamelessness and impiety in the city, 
being hated, poor, and excluded, to die of starvation, since they neither shared water 
with him, nor wished to provide fire, as they share with all those who need and ask 
for». Bearzot 1999, 56 believes that there is no connection between the lexicon and 
Xenophon’s Hellenica. If this is right, we have more evidence that the historian tells the 
truth about this man.
 102 See Bearzot 1997, 130-131.
 103 See Harris 2013, 288-289.
Erga -Logoi – 7 (2019) 2
https://www.ledonline.it/Erga-Logoi - Online ISSN 2282-3212 - Print ISSN 2280-9678 
Xenophon and Lysias on the Arginousai Trial
35
However, the differences are many. (1) Lysias does not say anything 
about the critical role of Theramenes in the accusations against the gener-
als during the first meeting of the Assembly, while Xenophon is clear that 
the trierarch was most aggressive against them and insisted that the gen-
erals did not blame anybody else except for the storm (Hell. I 7, 4; 31). In 
the light of Lysias’ denunciation of Theramenes’ crimes (XII 62-79) as an 
important part of the case against Eratosthenes, who claimed association 
with Theramenes’ faction, the orator could have said something against 
Theramenes. On the other hand, Theramenes had acted against the gen-
erals only secretly, as I said earlier, so Lysias did not have any proofs 
against him to attack him for the condemnation of the commanders  104. 
(2) Lysias omits to say that the generals spoke only briefly in the second 
meeting of the Assembly, so they did not defend themselves individually. 
(3) He does not say anything about the Councillor Callixenus and his 
illegal decree, which became accepted by the boule. (4) He disregards 
the fact that an anonymous man appeared in the third meeting of the 
Assembly and claimed that the drowning men demanded the punish-
ment of the generals. (5) He does not say that Euryptolemus and others 
tried to stop Callixenus’ decree in the third Assembly meeting through 
a graphe paranomon, but that most of the Athenians turned into a mob 
because they felt that the democracy was threatened. (6) He does not 
say that the Assemblymen violated their law which guaranteed a fair trial 
to the generals. (7) He does not say that Euryptolemus tried to prevent 
this illegality by insisting on the need to abide by the law. (8) And he 
does not allege that the commanders conspired against the Athenians  105 
or that the Athenian democracy suffered any wrong from them. This is 
striking compared to the people’s reaction in the trial that the generals 
had turned against their city.
From this comparison it is logical to conclude that Lysias is very brief 
regarding the events that took place in the Arginousai trial. How should 
we explain the different accounts of Xenophon and the orator? We 
 104 My argument replies to the remark of Kagan 1987, 369, Krentz 1989, 162 and 
Hamel 2015, 79-80 that Lysias does not accuse Theramenes about his guilt in the Argi-
nousai trial. Gottesmann 2014, 134-135 accepts Xenophon’s account by saying that (a) 
he does not actually say that Theramenes orchestrated it; instead he holds responsible 
«the associates of Theramenes» and (b) we should not be surprised if the stunt did not 
become one of the stock charges against him especially if the Athenians blamed others 
for misleading them on this occasion. However, this interpretation does not take into 
account that Theramenes acted in secret. My analysis agrees with that of Piovan 2011, 
43-44 and Bearzot, 2013b, 99-100.
 105 Lysias keeps this scenario only for the Thirty (XII 42-45) and Theramenes (XII 
62-78); see Roisman 2006, 79-80.
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could say that there would be no reason to expect a longer digression on 
the Arginousai trial during Lysias’ prosecution of Eratosthenes, since this 
was not the main subject, or for a forensic orator to provide the full truth 
and context regarding any passing historical allusion. Besides, when the 
orator delivered his speech, few Athenians could remember in detail what 
had been said in the three meetings of the Assembly about the generals 
or every detail of the procedures followed. Finally, Euryptolemus’ speech 
would have been forgotten after a while. Only Xenophon’s readers and 
modern readers can find out what took place in the Arginousai trial, so 
we try to find more in Lysias’ text than he had written. These arguments 
are right only if we forget that the trial was illegally handled and that 
the Athenians had regretted about the execution of the generals after the 
trial, as Xenophon and Plato testify. However, as I argued earlier, the 
opposite is true. The Athenians did change their mind about the sup-
posed anti-democratic action of their commanders. 
This means that Lysias’ short reference to the Arginousai trial was 
not coincidental, but it indicates that the orator knew what had taken 
place in that fatal Assembly meeting. The question how he acquired this 
knowledge is not difficult to answer. Lysias was a metic, so he could not 
have participated in the Assembly-trial meeting which condemned the 
generals to death  106. Nevertheless, it is most probable that he learned 
about the trial by speaking with Athenians who had participated in it  107, 
as Xenophon could have done  108, and/or through some public discus-
sion which had taken place regarding the case and its verdict.
Moreover, what Lysias indicates, if he does not prove, is that there 
must have been a hot debate in Athens about the conviction of the gener-
als at that time, especially because of the defeat at Aegospotami  109. Three 
reasons justify such a thought. First, Euryptolemus had connected the 
Arginousai trial with a possible defeat of the Athenians in the Peloponne-
sian War. Some Athenians could have remembered Euryptolemus’ warn-
ing. Second, Callixenus had left Athens when the city had not suffered 
 106 For the non-participation of metics in meetings of the Assembly see e.g. Mac-
Dowell 1978, 75-76.
 107 Cf. Harris 2013, 292, who remarks that a speaker does not indicate how he 
discovered the ratio dicendi for the decision, but there is no reason to doubt that he 
could have spoken with the judges after a trial and discussed why they voted as they 
did.
 108 See supra, p. 30.
 109 For the military engagement between Lysander and the Athenians at Aegos-
potami see all the testimonies conveniently collected by Rhodes 1981, 426. For the reac-
tion of the Athenians to the defeat see Xen. Hell. II 2, 3; 10. Lysias himself refers to the 
defeat of the Athenians at Aegospotami in XII 43.
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any defeat from Sparta yet but he returned after the reconciliation agree-
ment when the humiliating defeat at Aegospotami was a painful memory 
in Athens  110 and the city was trying to remember and forget the rule of the 
Thirty  111. Third, the account of Pseudo-Aristotle’s Ath. Pol. 34, 1 makes a 
short bridge between 411/10 and 404/3 B.C., and Arginousai and Aegos-
potami are two of the items which he mentions. More specifically, he says 
that when the naval battle of Arginousai took place, the demos convicted 
the generals who defeated the Lacedaimonians in one vote because it was 
deceived by those who made it angry. Afterwards the Spartans wanted 
to make peace with Athens, but Cleophon prevented them from doing 
so. Because of this decision, (Aristotle) tells us, the Athenians lost the 
naval battle at Aegospotami. This author does not tell us how he knows 
what he knows  112. On the other hand, his information about the end of 
the Peloponnesian War is not in complete agreement with Xenophon, 
so his source is different  113. This means that the connection between 
the naval battle at Arginousai, the trial of the generals and the defeat at 
Aegospotami must be sought elsewhere. Rhodes says that «the bare facts 
in 34, 1-2 will have been common knowledge in the fourth century»  114. It 
is certain that Ath. Pol. postdates Lysias’ speech. On the other hand, if we 
consider that Lysias and (Aristotle) bridge the aforementioned incidents 
in such a similar way, this cannot be a coincidence. The Athenians must 
have discussed the conviction of the Arginousai generals to death and the 
defeat of their fleet in the Hellespont by Lysander. If these thoughts are 
not right, it is difficult to explain, for me at least, why Lysias compares 
the generals of Arginousai with the Thirty in this passage.
Thus, when Lysias claims that there was a strong conviction on the 
part of the Athenians that they should punish the generals because they 
were guilty and thus they should appease the living for the loss of the dead, 
he has in mind the thoughts of the Athenians during the trial, not after it.
On the basis of this analysis it logical to conclude that Lysias’ men-
tion of the Arginousai trial was selective. The orator knew that an explicit 
justification of the punishment of the generals was a risky argument given 
 110 See Lys. XXI 9 with Kapellos 2014, 91-95. For the «rhetoric of the naval battle 
at Aegospotami» cf.: Kapellos 2009, 260, 263; Kapellos 2012, 99-100; Bearzot 2017b, 
41-52.
 111 See Wolpert 2002.
 112 See Rhodes 1981, 25.
 113 For a thorough discussion of (Aristotle)’s passage and a comparison between it 
and Xenophon and Diodorus see Rhodes 1981, 422-426. For the issue that (Aristotle) 
did not use Xenophon except for chapter 36 see Rhodes 1981, 20.
 114 Rhodes 1981, 416. 
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that the Athenians had changed their minds about the generals. So he 
should not appear as instructing his audience about the recent past  115. 
Moreover, Lysias could not admit that the Athenians executed the gener-
als after having taken an illegal decision and then changed their mind 
about the condemnation of the commanders; otherwise he would weaken 
his position as a prosecutor and at the same time he would alienate his 
audience  116. This becomes most imperative if we consider that Lysias was 
a metic, that is an isolated and vulnerable figure who did not have the 
same status as the Athenian citizens in courts  117. This means that he had 
to be very careful in his criticism of the Athenian democracy and, in any 
case, he could not insist on the Arginousai affair any further. On the other 
hand, Lysias knew that the jurors would hear his speech only once  118, so 
a brief reference to the Arginousai trial was enough for him to create a 
specific impression for the jurors about the need to punish the Thirty. 
Now that the Athenians had exculpated the commanders of Argin-
ousai, Lysias seizes the opportunity to make an argument ex contrariis 
between the generals and the Thirty (μέν … δέ)  119. Through this antith-
esis and comparison he creates a setting in which the jurors are to view 
the Thirty  120. At the same time the audience is itself implicated in each 
of the antitheses. If the jurors follow the speaker’s thought, they are led 
to the same legal and moral thoughts he makes for them: the Thirty con-
spired against the city, even when they were not involved in politics, and 
when they took over Athens, they executed many citizens without a trial. 
The claims against the Thirty deserve analysis. Lysias alleges that the 
Thirty started their evil plans against their city before the expedition of the 
Athenian fleet at Aegospotami. At first, they played a very active part in the 
political life of Athens as speakers in the Assembly and the courts  121, that 
is, they were members of political clubs that acted for the military defeat 
 115 For the avoidance of the orators to appear as instructors of their fellow citizens 
see Pearson 1941, 209-229, especially 213.
 116 See Dover 1974, 5-8; Ober 1989, 43-49 that orators should express values and 
conceptions that were acceptable by the majority of the people.
 117 See Patterson 2000, 93-112, especially 108-111 for her analysis of Lys. XII.
 118 According to Plut. Mor. 504c, a client of Lysias read the speech that the 
speechwriter wrote for him. The first time he found the speech persuasive but after 
reading the text again and again he discovered many flaws. Lysias responded that that 
the jurors would hear the speech only once.
 119 For other examples of this argument in the same speech and other speeches in 
the corpus Lysiacum see Bateman 1962, 161-171.
 120 For this argument as an argument by comparison see Usher 1985, 242. 
 121 For this meaning of the word idiotes see Rubinstein 1998, 125-143, especially 
126-127, 135.
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of Athens in the war  122. This could mean that they urged the Athenians to 
vote for the election of Tydaeus, Menander, Cephisodotus, Adeimantus 
and Philocles who served as generals at Aegospotami (Xen. Hell. I 7, 1; 
II 1, 16) but proved themselves incompetent to defeat Lysander. Some 
of the Thirty must have taken part in the expedition at Aegospotami, so 
they weakened the position of the fleet, which lost the naval battle. After 
the surrender of the city to Lysander they came to power, but instead of 
ruling lawfully, since they had been appointed for this reason  123, they 
admitted that they intentionally executed many Athenians without proper 
trial (ἀκρίτους). It is obvious that this is another scenario of conspiracy 
regarding the defeat at Aegospotami  124 which is not true  125 but conformed 
to the social expectations of the Athenians  126, who had not explained to 
themselves why they lost the sea battle in the Hellespont  127. Moreover, 
although the Thirty intentionally executed many citizens without a legal 
trial  128, there is no proof that they explicitly said that they admitted their 
actions. This is only a conclusion which is borne out of reality itself. It is 
evident that Lysias tries to distract the jurors’ attention from the fact that 
the Athenians had condemned the generals of Arginousai ἀκρίτους (Xen. 
Hell. I 7, 25) before the Thirty followed the same tactic.
Therefore, on the basis of this analysis, I agree with Gish that Lysias 
is reminding the demos of its vigorous and decisive action on that prior 
occasion in defence of democracy against the generals. However, this is 
the surface of the argument, as I have argued. Thus, I cannot agree with 
Gish that the Athenians still believed that the Arginousai commanders 
had conspired to overthrow the rule of the demos.
In conclusion, Lysias’ speech cannot provide an accurate under-
standing of the historical persons, places, and events mentioned in it. The 
 122 See Bearzot 1997, 131-132.
 123 See Krentz 1995, 122-124.
 124 See supra, n. 110 for «the rhetoric of Aegospotami».
 125 Usher 1985, 242 rightly remarks that the presence of some of the Thirty at 
Aegospotami could have been a factor but we have no proofs that any of them served in 
the Hellespont (see Krentz 1982, 51-55 for the prosopography of the Thirty). For what 
really happened at Aegospotami see Kapellos 2009, 257-259; Kapellos 2013, 97-99; 
Kapellos 2014, 9-10.
 126 For the issue that the orators had to conform to the values and conceptions of 
their jurors see Dover 1974, 5-8; Ober 1989, 43-49.
 127 Cf. Lys. XXI 10 (with Kapellos 2014, 100) and supra, n. 110 for «the rhetoric 
of Aegospotami» again.
 128 Cf. Diod. XIV 4, 2-3 who says that the Thirty executed their fellow citizens 
without a legal trial with Isoc. IV 113; VII 67; XX 11; Lys. XII 82, 83; Dem. XL 46; 
Aeschin. II 77; III 235, who repeat the same accusation. 
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orator is concerned with the given example’s relevance to his argument 
rather than with historical accuracy because it is accommodated to the 
ideals and beliefs of his audience. His purpose is not to defend the Athe-
nian democracy but to offer an accepted explanation about the execution 
of the Arginousai generals, having in mind the remorse of the Athenians, 
in order to force the jurors to convict Eratosthenes.
 aggelos kapellos
 University of Ioannina
 agkap75@yahoo.gr
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